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ABSTRACT 
 
Wage Distributions by Bargaining Regime: 
Linked Employer-Employee Data Evidence from Germany
*
 
Using linked employer-employee data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001, 
this paper provides a comprehensive picture of the wage structure in three wage-setting 
regimes prevalent in the German system of industrial relations. We analyze wage 
distributions for various labor market subgroups by means of kernel density estimation, 
variance decompositions, and individual and firm-level wage regressions. Unions' impact 
through collective and firm-level bargaining mainly works towards a higher wage level and 
reduced overall and residual wage dispersion. Yet observed effects are considerably 
heterogeneous across different labor market groups. There is no clear evidence for wage 
floors formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets which would operate as minimum 
wages for different groups of workers. 
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responsibility. 1 Introduction
Trade unions bargain for higher wages, equal pay, fair working conditions, or employ-
ment protection (Freeman and Medo® 1984). Classical models such as monopoly unions,
right-to-manage models, or e±cient bargaining predict a monotonic positive relation-
ship between union power and the level of bargained wages; see the surveys of Farber
(1986), Oswald (1985), and Naylor (2003). Some more recent studies emphasize e®ects
on higher moments of the wage distribution. In line with an insurance motive for union
representation of risk-averse workers (Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995), union im-
pact compresses the wage distribution relative to the distribution of productivities. By
enforcing \equal pay for equal work" unions further seek to limit favoritism and discrim-
ination by superiors and colleagues, and to encourage solidarity among the work force
(Freeman 1982). Union-bargained wages may serve as wage °oors, thereby narrowing the
distribution of wages from below.
Collective agreements re°ecting unions' bargaining objectives then have two e®ects
on the structure of wages. First, di®erences between covered and non-covered segments
would increase as the result of the unions' strive for higher wages. Second, wage compres-
sion induced through a collective contract would reduce within-segment inequality. The
question which e®ect would prevail has been discussed for some time in the Anglo-Saxon
context; see the survey of Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003).
However, the Anglo-Saxon concept of union gaps or membership premia is inappropri-
ate for Germany because collective agreements constituting discriminatory wage policies
with disadvantages for non-members are forbidden by constitutional law (negative freedom
of association, negative Koalitionsfreiheit, Grundgesetz Art. 9). The scope of collective
agreements goes beyond the organized parties. Wages set at the ¯rm level as well as
individually bargained wages are adapted towards collective bargaining agreements, be
it in order to reduce transaction costs or not to create incentives for employees to join
a union. Collective bargaining coverage thus is considerably higher than union density.
The decision whether to apply a collective contract or not is basically left to the ¯rms.
In the interpretation of Dustmann and SchÄ onberg (2004), ¯rms use collective agreements
as a commitment device.
Employees are paid either according to individual contracts between the employee
and the ¯rm or according to a collective agreement. The collective agreement can be
negotiated between a union and an employers' association, a union and a ¯rm, or a works
council and a ¯rm. Arrangements between ¯rm and works council are only allowed to
govern wages or salaries if the ¯rm is not subject to a collective contract or if the collective
1contract explicitly allows for this type of arrangement.1 Firm-level agreements involving
a union are allowed to set wages even if a collective agreement exists, as long as the
¯rm-level agreement is more speci¯c than the collective agreement. No more than one
collective wage agreement must apply at the same time, but not all employees working
in a ¯rm applying a collective agreement are automatically covered. Collective contracts
may also contain an opening clause explicitly allowing deviations from the terms of the
contract under particular circumstances (Heinbach 2006).
Collective bargaining coverage, as measured by the share of employment contracts
following collective agreements, was relatively stable in West Germany until the mid 1990's
but has been declining since. By the year 2003, 70% (45%) of West German employees
(¯rms) were covered by a collective agreement (Schnabel 2005). With respective shares
of 47% and 26%, coverage in East Germany was markedly lower.2 The \erosion" towards
more decentralized wage setting is examined by a group of studies using ¯rm-level data,
and is recon¯rmed by survey evidence from works councils.3
Evidence on the e®ects of bargaining coverage on the German wage structure is still
sparse. In this paper we use newly available linked employer-employee data for Germany,
the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung)
2001, in order to provide a ¯rst comprehensive picture of wage structures in the di®erent
bargaining regimes for various labor market subgroups. Broadening the scope of previ-
ous results at the Federal-State level, we compare individual, ¯rm-level, and collective
bargaining among male full-time employees, female full-time, and female part-time em-
ployees, and we distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar workers and between
establishments in East and West Germany.
The thrust of our ¯ndings con¯rms a priori expectations. Union impact through
collective bargaining results in a higher wage level as well as reduced overall and residual
wage dispersion. Yet there is no clear evidence for disproportionate wage compression from
below or a wage °oor formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets. Moreover, we
detect considerable heterogeneity of union impacts across di®erent labor market groups
as well as subtle di®erences between individual and ¯rm-level evidence.
The course of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews related studies
in the literature. Section 3 introduces the GSES 2001 data. Framework and results of
1See Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick (2006) for a discussion of the e®ects of German works councils.
2In contrast, aggregate gross union density|i.e., the ratio of the number of union members and the
number of employees in the German labor market|was only 27% in the year 2004 (Fitzenberger, Kohn,
and Wang 2006).
3Kohaut and Bellmann (1997), Bellmann, Kohaut, and Schnabel (1999), Kohaut and Schnabel (2003b,
2003a), Bispinck and Schulten (2003), Bosch (2004).
2our empirical investigation are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Empirical studies of the impact of the di®erent bargaining regimes in Germany have
become feasible with recent years' growing availability of linked employer-employee data.
Based on linked data of the IAB employment statistics and the IAB establishment panel,
Dustmann and SchÄ onberg (2004) ¯nd that under collective coverage, employee turnover
is higher, wage cuts occur more often, and (conditional) wages have a lower variance.
GÄ urtzgen (2006), also using linked IAB data, reports positive wage premia for industry-
level contracts in West Germany and for ¯rm-level contracts in East Germany.
A couple of studies analyze subsamples of the German Structure of Earnings Survey
(GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung). Using di®erent cross sections (1990, 1995,
2001) of the manufacturing subsample for the state of Lower-Saxony, Gerlach and Stephan
(2002, 2006a, 2006c) report kernel density estimates of log wage distributions for labor
market regimes with and without collective and ¯rm-level wage agreements, and estimate
¯rm-level wage regressions. Average hourly wages paid in accordance with a collective or
a ¯rm-level agreement are higher than the average of individually negotiated wages. Yet
unconditional as well as conditional wage dispersion is highest among individual contracts.
Di®erences between regimes increased between the years 1990 and 2001. Similar results are
obtained by Bechtel, MÄ odinger, and Strotmann (2004) based on the GSES subsample for
the state of Baden-WÄ urttemberg. Multi-level regression models in Stephan and Gerlach
(2003, 2005) reveal that di®erences in individual wages are consistent with a higher base
wage in case of collective coverage. Returns to human capital|skill, experience, and
tenure|as well as residual wage dispersion are lower under collective coverage. Gerlach
and Stephan (2006b) note that collective agreements compress within-¯rm compensation
schemes across occupations.
Heinbach (2006) merges the GSES subsample for Baden-WÄ urttemberg with informa-
tion on the existence of opening clauses in collective agreements. When distinguishing
between collective agreements with and those without opening clauses in ¯rm-level re-
gressions, he ¯nds that mean wages for blue-collar workers in manufacturing are lower
under opening clauses, but no signi¯cant wage di®erences exist for white-collar workers.
Moreover, no signi¯cant di®erences exist regarding wage dispersion as measured by the
standard deviation of wages.
In a companion paper (Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke 2007) we augment the GSES
2001 by estimates of union membership taken from Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006)
3in order to simultaneously study the impacts of both collective bargaining regimes and
union bargaining power as measured by net union density at an aggregate level.4 Col-
lective bargaining as well as net union density signi¯cantly in°uence wages. Individual
coverage and union density lower wages, while the ¯rm-level share of covered employees
raises wages. This result corroborates the notion that bargaining coverage and union
density have distinct e®ects on the German wage structure (cf. Fitzenberger and Kohn
2005).
A collective agreement does not constrain a ¯rm's right to pay premia above the
wage set in the collective contract. So actual wages may di®er substantially from the
contractual wage. This aspect is examined by the wage-drift literature and studies related
to nominal, notional, or real wage rigidity; see, e.g., Bauer, Bonin, and Sunde (2003) and
Pfei®er (2003). Cardoso and Portugal (2005) analyze the gap between contractual and
actual wages for employees covered by di®erent types of collective agreements in Portugal.5
They ¯nd that the positive e®ect of union strength|as measured by the share of covered
employees|on the level of contractual wages is partly o®set by a smaller wage cushion.
So higher contractual wages in sectors with a high share of covered employees may not
lead to higher actual wages by the same degree.
3 Data
Our study is based on the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und
Lohnstrukturerhebung) 2001, a cross-sectional linked employer-employee data set contain-
ing about 850,000 employees in some 22,000 ¯rms. Missing essentially the public sector,
the GSES 2001 covers the major part of industry and private services. There are several
advantages to using the GSES 2001. It is one of the largest mandatory surveys available
for Germany. The sample not only includes workers in regular employment, but also
employees in vocational training, marginal employment, or partial retirement schemes.
In contrast to earlier GSES waves and to the IAB linked employer-employee data set
(LIAB), wages are neither truncated nor censored so that lower and upper parts of the
wage distribution can be analyzed precisely. Moreover, and most importantly for our
study, collective bargaining coverage is recorded for each of the individuals, and not only
at the ¯rm level as, e.g., in the LIAB. GSES data are gathered from ¯rms' o±cial report-
ing obligations. Therefore, they are more reliable than information from individual-level
4Net union density in homogenously de¯ned labor market segments is estimated by average union
membership propensities.
5Cardoso and Portugal (2005) refer to this gap as \wage cushion" (p. 877) in order to distinguish it
from the notion of wage drift, which traditionally focusses on the change of the gap.
4surveys or data not covered by duties of disclosure (Jacobebbinghaus 2002).
The GSES 2001 has only recently been made available for research. So far, analyses
with GSES data have been restricted to administrative use or to regional subsamples (cf.
Fitzenberger and Reize (2002, 2003) and the studies cited in section 2). See Hafner (2005)
and Statistisches Bundesamt (2000, 2004) for descriptions of the data set. Details on the
on-site-use version employed in this study and our selection of data are provided in the
appendix.
We consider male full-time, female full-time, and female part-time employees and
distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar workers and between East and West Ger-
many. Our analysis focusses on the distribution of log hourly wages in three regimes of
bargaining coverage:
² CC: collective contract negotiated between an employers' association and a union.
² FC: ¯rm-level contract negotiated between a ¯rm and a union or a works council.
² IC: individual contracts negotiated between employer and employee.
Table 1 displays the shares of employees in the respective labor market groups covered
by the di®erent bargaining regimes. The numbers are broadly in line with those reported
by other studies using di®erent data sets, but|ranging between 28 and 61%|collective
coverage rates di®er considerably between di®erent types of employees.6 Coverage is
generally lower in East Germany than in the West.7 In comparison to females, male
workers exhibit higher coverage rates among blue-collars, but lower rates among white-
collars. Coverage among white-collar workers is usually higher than among blue-collar
workers, with the notable exception of male full-time workers in West Germany. For this
traditional core group we observe the highest coverage rate of 61%. Firm-level agreements
are not applied as often as collective agreements, but again the share of covered employees
varies between 4% and 13% across types of employees.
4 Wage Distributions by Bargaining Regime
4.1 Unconditional Distributions
Table 2 reports means and standard deviations of log hourly wages by bargaining regimes
for the di®erent labor market groups. The overall picture meets a priori expectations.
6Kohaut and Schnabel (2003a) and Schnabel (2005) report di®erences by industries and establishment
size, respectively. However, none of these studies di®erentiates by labor market subgroups.
7Only for the group of female part-time employees, the East-West di®erence is basically negligible.
5However, there are noteworthy di®erences between groups regarding both wage levels and
wage dispersion.
Average wages are in most cases highest under ¯rm-level contracts, closely followed by
collective contracts, and both FC and CC leaving individually negotiated wages behind.
Yet there is the notable exception of male full-time white-collar workers in West Germany,
for whom the average of wages set in individual contracts is highest. So even though we
have excluded white-collar workers in the highest professional status category (leitende
Angestellte), employees payed above the agreed scale rate (au¼ertari°iche Angestellte)
have a pronounced e®ect on the wage level. As expected, higher wages are paid in West
Germany as compared to the East, for men as compared to women, and for full-time
employees as compared to part-timers.
Overall wage dispersion is generally highest among individual contracts, but again
we ¯nd diverse patterns. Considering white-collars, dispersion is higher among ¯rm-level
agreements than among collective contracts in West Germany, but the ranking is reversed
in the East. In total though, di®erences between East and West Germany are small.
Dispersion among blue-collar workers is generally lower than among white-collars. East
German blue-collar workers even face lowest overall dispersion when being paid according
to individual contracts.
Mean and standard deviation are only insu±cient measures of the distributions if there
are categorization e®ects leading to multiple peaks or if the di®erent bargaining regimes
have asymmetric impacts, such as predicted by a minimum-wage argument for collective
wages. We therefore estimate the densities fr(yr) of log wages yr ´ ln(wr) in regimes r
by means of nonparametric kernel density estimation:
^ fh(y) =
1
Nh
N X
i=1
K
µy ¡ yi
h
¶
; (1)
where i = 1;:::;N denotes individuals and the index r is omitted for notational simplic-
ity. We employ an Epanechnikov kernel K(¢) and choose the bandwidth h according to
Silverman's (1986) rule of thumb.
By and large, our ¯ndings in ¯gure 1 match those in the related literature, with
densities of individual wages being located to the left of the densities of collective and
¯rm-level agreements, and IC densities showing higher variances and more mass at the
tails. For most groups, the shape of the FC density is more similar to that of CC than
to the shape of the IC density. Evidence regarding the skewness of the distributions is
mixed, though. We ¯nd no clear support for the hypothesis that lower wage brackets in
collective and ¯rm-level agreements form strong wage °oors and compress the distribution
from below. Moreover, there are important di®erences between labor market groups. For
6example, there are notable categorization e®ects among part-time workers with collective
or ¯rm-level contracts, as well as among full-time blue-collar women in East Germany. For
these groups, the distributions show very pronounced or even multiple peaks, indicating
that employees are selected into certain wage brackets which are similar across ¯rms and
occupations.8 We also ¯nd that the high average of IC wages among the large group of
male white-collar workers in West Germany is supported by a less clear-cut mode and
relatively high mass in the upper half of the distribution, even though there is also a long
left tail.
In order to approach the nature of wage dispersion underlying the observed distrib-
utions, we decompose the variance of log hourly wages for each regime into within and
between-¯rm e®ects:
J X
j=1
Nj X
i=1
(yij ¡ ¹ y)
2 =
J X
j=1
Nj X
i=1
(yij ¡ ¹ yj)
2 +
J X
j=1
Nj(¹ yj ¡ ¹ y)
2; (2)
where yij denotes the log hourly wage of individual i in ¯rm j, ¹ yj the mean log hourly
wage in ¯rm j, ¹ y the overall mean log hourly wage, and Nj the number of employees in
¯rm j.
The height of the bars in ¯gure 2 recalls the level of overall dispersion discussed above.
With respect to the shares of within and between-dispersion, there are generally little
di®erences between the bargaining regimes, but considerable ones across groups. Whereas
variation within and between ¯rms both contribute equally to the dispersion among white-
collar workers, blue-collar workers|and in particular those in East Germany|exhibit
a disproportionately large share of between-¯rm e®ects. While highlighting again the
existence of heterogeneity across groups, these ¯ndings also show the necessity to control
for di®erences between ¯rms as well as di®erences between individuals within the same
¯rm when judging pay di®erentials between bargaining regimes.
4.2 Individual-Level Wage Regressions
In order to control for di®erent selections of workers and ¯rms into bargaining regimes in
terms of observable characteristics, we estimate °exible individual-level wage regressions
using sets of covariates fully interacted with regime indicators. As to the focus of our
analysis, this approach has two advantages. First, it allows not only the base level of
wages to vary between regimes, but also the e®ects of all covariates. Second, we can
8Alternatively, the number of observations for these groups (coming down to about 500 for part-time
blue-collar women in the East) might already be too small for nonparametric estimation, such that the
results would re°ect a statistical artefact. However, the pronounced patterns rather suggest the existence
of categorization e®ects.
7subsequently analyze the distributions of the residuals in order to shed light on di®erences
in residual wage dispersion between the regimes.
We exploit the nature of the linked employer-employee data set and include covariates
Xij at the individual level, such as human capital variables (educational attainment,
age, tenure) and workplace-related characteristics (indicators for shift-work or work on
Sundays, etc.), as well as ¯rm-level covariates Zj, such as size and industry of the ¯rm or
average characteristics of the ¯rm's workforce:
yij = ®0 + CCij®1 + FCij®2 + ~ Xij¯0 + CCij ~ Xij¯1 + FCij ~ Xij¯2
+ ~ Zj°0 + CCij ~ Zj°1 + FCij ~ Zj°2 + ²ij: (3)
As the covariates ~ Xij = Xij¡ ¹ X and ~ Zj = Zj¡ ¹ Z are included in terms of deviations from
sample means, the coe±cients ®1 and ®2 can be interpreted as average partial e®ects of
collective and ¯rm-level contracts. Estimates of these are summarized in table 4.9 Ceteris
paribus, workers covered by either a collective or a ¯rm-level agreement earn signi¯cantly
higher wages in almost all labor market groups.10 Unions (or works councils) are thus more
successful in bargaining for higher wages as compared to individual workers themselves.11
Yet again there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity across labor market groups. Not
only do the positive APEs vary in a range between 1% and 43%, but the APE of CC
among male white-collar employees working full-time in West Germany is even negative
by the order of 2%. Employees of this prominent group in fact receive a premium if they
do not subject themselves to collective contracts. So the larger share of employees payed
above the agreed scale rate (au¼ertari°iche Angestellte) has a pronounced e®ect on the
wage level net of all observable individual and ¯rm-level controls.12
Evidence on the ranking of CC and FC premia is mainly inconclusive, but in most
cases the two are close to each other. With the exception of the group of female part-time
workers in East Germany|for whom the estimation is generally least precise|APEs
are also similar between blue-collar and white-collar workers. However, the e®ects are
considerably larger in East Germany than in West Germany, and for women as compared
9We also experimented with variants of equation (3) including only individual-level covariates Xij. In
contrast to the presented model using the rich set of covariates, these variants could be estimated with
¯rm-¯xed e®ects. As it turned out, estimates do usually not di®er with respect to the ranking of wages
by regime. De¯nitions of all employed variables are provided in table 3. Complete regression results are
available from the authors upon request.
10Only a couple of FC e®ects with a small absolute value do not turn out signi¯cant.
11GÄ urtzgen (2005a, 2005b) discusses rent-sharing as a plausible explanation for related ¯ndings.
12Note again that we have excluded white-collar workers in the highest professional status category
(leitende Angestellte); cf. section 4.1. Note further that|even though being positive|the APEs of CC
and FC among male blue-collar workers in West Germany are also comparably small.
8to men. Whereas the latter result re°ects the fact that institutionalized wage setting
reduces pay di®erentials in general, and gender wage gaps in particular, the former result
is in line with the view that a larger number of ¯rms in East Germany who have opted
out of collective contracts in recent years, have done explicitly so in order to set lower
wages.
4.3 Residual Wage Dispersion
The residuals from individual-level wage regressions provide insights into unions' impact
on residual wage dispersion, i.e., on variation remaining after individual and ¯rm char-
acteristics have been controlled for. In ¯gure 3 we compare residual variances between
regimes and across groups and provide decompositions into within and between-¯rm ef-
fects.13 As expected, residual wage dispersion is considerably lower than overall dispersion
and the share of between-¯rm variation net of observable in°uences is considerably smaller.
There is a clear ranking between regimes, with individual contracts showing the highest
residual dispersion. In contrast to the case of overall dispersion, this ¯nding now holds for
all groups, as the regressions capture the categorization e®ects detected above. Unions'
impact on reducing wage dispersion shows in both collective and ¯rm-level bargaining.
In general, the level of residual dispersion is lower among blue-collar workers as com-
pared to white-collars, and fairly similar in East and West Germany. Yet the di®erence
between IC dispersion on the one hand and CC and FC dispersion on the other is more
pronounced in the East. Unions therefore have a larger impact in East Germany.
4.4 Firm-Level Wage Regressions
Finally, we compare the regimes with respect to ¯rm-average wage levels and to wage
dispersion within ¯rms in a ¯rm-level regression framework. We regress the average of log
wages ¹ yj and the standard deviation of log wages ¾j, respectively, on a set of ¯rm-level
control variables.14 This approach o®ers the advantage that it explicitly considers both
the wage level and wage dispersion within ¯rms.
We specify
¹ yj = ®0 + SHARE CCj®1 + SHARE FCj®2 + Zj· + "j (4)
13We use the residuals from individual wage regressions estimated separately for the three regimes.
Note that the asymptotic distribution of residuals does not reveal any skewness or kurtosis e®ects by
construction. Residual kernel density estimates reported in ¯gure 4 corroborate this notion.
14We include shares for variables which are discrete at the individual level, and mean values for con-
tinuous ones.
9and
¾j = ±0 + SHARE CCj±1 + SHARE FCj±2 + Zj¸ + ºj; (5)
where SHARE CCj and SHARE FCj denote the share of workers in ¯rm j covered by
collective and ¯rm-level agreements, respectively.
The results in table 5 reveal signi¯cant mark-ups for both collective and ¯rm-level
bargaining coverage. Di®erences between collective and ¯rm-level agreements are of minor
importance, but again there is notable heterogeneity across groups. For example, a change
from zero to full CC (FC) coverage would increase wages by 2% (3%) for male blue-collar
workers in West Germany, but by 24% (22%) for part-time working white-collar women
in the East. The e®ects are considerably larger in East Germany than in West Germany,
for women as compared to men, and for white-collar workers compared to blue-collar
workers.
The impacts measured at the ¯rm level thus coincide with the impacts estimated at the
individual level for most labor market groups. However, the ¯rm-level regressions are not
su±cient for detecting|in particular|the subtle di®erences for the group of male white-
collar workers in West Germany because they do not capture selection e®ects to the same
degree. As not only ¯rms take the decision whether to apply collective contracts at all, but
also individuals within ¯rms select themselves based on their personal characteristics, it
is in fact important to consider the individual level (cf. Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke
2007).
Regarding ¯rm-level wage dispersion, both collective and ¯rm-level coverage show neg-
ative signs, even though only the e®ects for male blue-collar workers turn out signi¯cant.
Being in line with the patterns revealed above, these results meet a priori expectations.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the wage structure in three wage-setting regimes prevalent in the
German system of industrial relations. Using newly available linked employer-employee
data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) 2001, we look at various
groups in the labor market in order to analyze unions' impact through collective and
¯rm-level bargaining on the structure of wages.
By and large, our ¯ndings meet a priori expectations. The impact of wage bargaining
mainly works towards a higher wage level and reduced overall, ¯rm-level, and residual
wage dispersion. Yet there is no clear evidence for disproportionate wage compression
from below or wage °oors formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets which
10would operate as minimum wages for di®erent groups of workers. Moreover, we detect
considerable heterogeneity in the impacts across di®erent labor market groups as well
as subtle di®erences between individual and ¯rm-level evidence. As a robust result, the
e®ects of wage bargaining are stronger in East Germany as compared to the West, and
for women as compared to men. On average, male white-collar workers in West Germany
earn highest wages when not covered by a collective contract.
There is a number of interesting issues for future research arising from our analysis.
First of all, di®erences regarding the returns to human capital and other individual and
¯rm-level characteristics should be analyzed in order to answer the question who gains
most from collective bargaining. Second, the choice of a bargaining regime is clearly en-
dogenous. Selection of individuals driven by observable characteristics would contribute to
explaining the revealed di®erences between individual and ¯rm-level evidence. However, it
is not possible to control for selection based on unobservable individual or match-speci¯c
e®ects, and therefore the results should be taken as descriptive rather than causal. As
¯nding valid instruments for collective coverage generally proves intricate, using a match-
ing technique as in Card and de la Rica (2006) would be a promising approach. Third, as
the GSES wave 1995 is scheduled to be made available for research, future studies might
take account of variations over time. Fourth, applying quantile regressions as in Fitzen-
berger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2007) or Bechtel (2006) would promise additional insights.
Fifth, and ¯nally, unions' impacts on the structure of wages and on employment should
be analyzed simultaneously.
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14A German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001
The German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung)
2001 is a linked employer-employee data set administered by the German Statistical O±ce
subject to European law (European Council Regulation (EC) No 530/1999, amended
by EC 1916/2000) as well as to German law (Law on Wage Statistics, LohnStatG). It
is a sample of all ¯rms in manufacturing and private service sectors with at least ten
employees; see table 6 for a synopsis of sectors sampled. Sampling takes place at the
¯rm or establishment level.15 At a ¯rst stage, ¯rms are randomly drawn at the Federal
State level, where the sampling probability varies between 5.3% for the largest state
(North Rhine-Westphalia) and 19.4% for the smallest (Bremen). Following a procedure
for comparable precision, the resulting standard deviation of gross wages in the smallest
Federal State is about twice the standard deviation in the largest State; see Krug, Nourney,
and Schmidt (2001) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2004). At the second stage, employees
are randomly chosen from the ¯rms sampled at the ¯rst stage. The share of employees
sampled depends upon the ¯rm size and ranges between 6.25% for the largest ¯rms and
100% for ¯rms with less than 20 employees. The data set provides sampling weights.
The GSES 2001 is available for on-site use at Research Centers of the Federal States'
Statistical O±ces (FDZ) since the year 2005. This study uses an anonymized use-¯le which
includes all ¯rms and employees form the original data except for one ¯rm in Berlin (the
only ¯rm in Berlin falling into NACE section C). Regional information is condensed to
12 \states", and some industries have been aggregated at the two-digit level. Overall, the
use-¯le consists of 22,040 sites with 846,156 sampled employees.
We focus on employees aged 16{65 years. Employees in vocational training, interns,
and employees subject to partial retirement schemes are left out because compensation for
these groups does not follow the regular compensation schedule, but special regulations
or even special collective bargaining agreements do apply. We also exclude white-collar
workers in the highest professional status category (category 1) who can reasonably be
expected to pursue management objectives and whose wages are hardly in the focus
of collective wage setting. Individuals who worked less than 90% of their contractual
working hours in October 2001 and individuals paid subject to a collective contract with
a missing identi¯cation number for the agreement are dropped. Part-time and full-time
employees are distinguished based on the employer's assessment recorded in the GSES.
For blue-collar workers, actual working time and not contractual working time is relevant
for monthly payments. We exclude individuals with an actual working time of more
15Throughout this paper, we use the terms ¯rm, establishment, and company site synonymously.
15than 390 hours in October 2001. We analyze gross hourly wages including premia. This
measure is more appropriate than wages without premia if premia are paid on a regular
basis. A lower bound of one euro is imposed for hourly wages.
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18Table 3: De¯nition of Variables
Label Description
Individual Level
AGE Age in years=10.
AGESQ AGE squared.
TENURE Tenure in years=10.
TENURESQ TENURE squared.
LOW EDUC Low level of education: no training beyond a school degree (or no school degree
at all).
MED EDUC Intermediate level of education: vocational training.
HIGH EDUC High level of education: university or technical college degree.
NA EDUC Missing information on the level of education.
BC STAT1 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 1: vocationally trained or com-
parably experienced worker with special skills and highly involved tasks.
BC STAT2 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 2: vocationally trained or com-
parably experienced worker.
BC STAT3 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 3: worker trained on-the-job.
BC STAT4 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 4: laborer.
WC STAT2 White-collar worker, professional status category 2: executive employee with
limited procuration.
WC STAT3 White-collar worker, professional status category 3: employee with special skills
or experience who works on his own responsibility on highly involved or complex
tasks.
WC STAT4 White-collar worker, professional status category 4: vocationally trained or
comparably experienced employee who works autonomously on involved tasks.
WC STAT5 White-collar worker, professional status category 5: vocationally trained or
comparably experienced employee working autonomously.
WC STAT6 White-collar worker, professional status category 6: employee working on sim-
ple tasks.
NIGHT Individual worked night shifts.
SUNDAY Individual worked on Sundays or on holidays.
SHIFT Individual worked shift.
OVERTIME Individual worked overtime.
Firm Level
S FEM Share of female employees.
S AGE1 Share of employees of age 20 or younger.
S AGE2 Share of employees of age 21{25.
S AGE3 Share of employees of age 26{30.
S AGE4 Share of employees of age 31{35.
S AGE5 Share of employees of age 36{40.
S AGE6 Share of employees of age 41{45.
S AGE7 Share of employees of age 46{50.
S AGE8 Share of employees of age 51{55.
S AGE9 Share of employees of age 56{60.
S AGE10 Share of employees of age 61 or older.
S TENURE1 Share of employees with less than 1 year of tenure.
S TENURE2 Share of employees with 1{2 years of tenure.
S TENURE3 Share of employees with 3{5 years of tenure.
S TENURE4 Share of employees with 6{10 years of tenure.
Continued on next page...
19... table 3 continued
Label Description
S TENURE5 Share of employees with 11{15 years of tenure.
S TENURE6 Share of employees with 16{20 years of tenure.
S TENURE7 Share of employees with 21{25 years of tenure.
S TENURE8 Share of employees with 26{30 years of tenure.
S TENURE9 Share of employees with 31 or more years of tenure.
S LOW EDUC Share of employees with LOW EDUC.
S MED EDUC Share of employees with MED EDUC.
S HIGH EDUC Share of employees with HIGH EDUC.
S NA EDUC Share of employees with NA EDUC.
HOURSWORKED Average hours worked in the ¯rm.
S IRREG Share of employees for whom any of NIGHT, SUNDAY, or SHIFT applies.
S OVERTIME Share of employees working overtime.
S BC Share of blue-collar workers.
S NOT FT Share of employees who do not work full-time.
FIRMSIZE1 Firm has between 10 and 49 employees.
FIRMSIZE2 Firm has between 50 and 249 employees.
FIRMSIZE3 Firm has between 250 and 499 employees.
FIRMSIZE4 Firm has between 500 and 999 employees.
FIRMSIZE5 Firm has between 1000 and 1999 employees.
FIRMSIZE6 Firm has 2000 or more employees.
SECTOR1 Mining and quarrying (NACE: 10{14)
SECTOR2 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco (NACE: 15{16)
SECTOR3 Manufacture of textiles and textile products; leather and leather products
(NACE: 17{19)
SECTOR4 Manufacture of wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper products
(NACE: 20{21)
SECTOR5 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (NACE: 22)
SECTOR6 Manufacture of coke, re¯ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel; chemicals
and chemical products (NACE: 23{24)
SECTOR7 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (NACE: 25)
SECTOR8 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (NACE: 26)
SECTOR9 Manufacture of basic metals; fabricated metal products, except from machinery
and equipment (NACE: 27{28)
SECTOR10 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (NACE: 29)
SECTOR11 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (NACE: 31)
SECTOR12 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; radio, television, and commu-
nication equipment and apparatus (NACE: 30 + 32)
SECTOR13 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
(NACE: 33)
SECTOR14 Manufacture of transport equipment (NACE: 34{35)
SECTOR15 Manufacture n.e.c. (NACE: 36{37)
SECTOR16 Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE: 40{41)
SECTOR17 Construction (NACE: 45)
SECTOR18 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of
automotive fuel (NACE: 50)
SECTOR19 Wholesale trade and commission trade except of motor vehicles and motorcy-
cles (NACE: 51)
SECTOR20 Retail trade, except from motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal
and household goods (NACE: 52)
SECTOR21 Hotels and restaurants (NACE: 55)
SECTOR22 Land transport; transport via pipelines; air transport (NACE: 60 + 62)
Continued on next page...
20... table 3 continued
Label Description
SECTOR23 Water transport (NACE: 61)
SECTOR24 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
(NACE: 63)
SECTOR25 Post and telecommunications (NACE: 64)
SECTOR26 Financial intermediation, except from insurance and pension funding; activi-
ties auxiliary to ¯nancial intermediation, except from insurance and pension
funding (NACE: 65 + 67.1)
SECTOR27 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security; activities
auxiliary to insurance and pension funding (NACE: 66 + 67.2)
SECTOR28 Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment without operator
and of personal and household goods (NACE: 70{71)
SECTOR29 Computer and related activities (NACE: 72)
SECTOR30 Research and development; other business activities (NACE: 73{74)
PUBLIC1 Firm is privately owned.
PUBLIC2 Firm is partly public-owned (<50%).
PUBLIC3 Firm is mainly public-owned (>50%).
REGION1 Firm is located in Schleswig-Holstein or Hamburg.
REGION2 Firm is located in Lower Saxony or Bremen.
REGION3 Firm is located in North Rhine-Westphalia.
REGION4 Firm is located in Hesse.
REGION5 Firm is located in Rhineland-Palatinate or Saarland.
REGION6 Firm is located in Baden-WÄ urttemberg.
REGION7 Firm is located in Bavaria.
REGION9 Firm is located in Brandenburg or Mecklenburg-West Pomerania.
REGION10 Firm is located in Saxony.
REGION11 Firm is located in Saxony-Anhalt.
REGION12 Firm is located in Thuringia.
Data source: GSES 2001.
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27Table 6: Sectors Sampled with the GSES 2001
European German
NACE Sector Regulation Law Data
C-F Industry yes yes yes
G Wholesale and Retail Trade yes yes yes
H Hotels and Restaurants yes no yes
I Transport, Storage and Communication yes no yes
J Financial Intermediation yes yes yes
K Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities yes no yes
M Education opt no no
N Health and Social Work opt no no
O Other Community, Social, and Personal Service Ac-
tivities
opt no no
yes: required sector; no: sector to be left out; opt: inclusion of sector optional.
Sectors not mentioned are excluded under both regulations.
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